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Abstract
In utility consistent models of household behavior, it is usually assumed
thar. t.ha hn~igPhnl A' c .,~c.,......~~~ p----.-.... C~. ue iiescribeà by a single utility
function. If the male and female partner have different preferences,
however, only under stringent conditions the preferences of the household
can be represented by a'representative' household utility function.
Although game theory provides an appropriate theoretical framework for a
more general approach, attempts to develop empirical models based on a more
general decision making framework have yet not been very succesful.
Bjorn and Vuong estimate game theoretic models of household labor force
participation assuming that the equilibrium concept is Nash (Bjorn and
Vuong, 1984) or Stackelberg (Bjorn and Vuong, 1985). A drawback of their
models is that these equilibrium concepts may yield allocations which are
not Pareto optimal. It is not likely, however, that in a household partners
will accept an allocation while moving to another allocation would improve
the position of both.
In the empirical model in this paper the fundamental assumption is that
observed allocations are Pareto optimal outcomes of a game being played in
the household. In contrast to the simultaneous models for discrete en-
dogenous variables with structural shift as proposed by Heckman (19~6), the
present model does not require any logical consistency condition on the
parameters in order to be statistically meaningful.3
1. Introduction
One of the distinctive features of the microeconometric analysis of labor
SUDD7 v r~~iri no thc~ 7 oyt dOC3d0 `;- ~- -- ~o .. c~ivwiii~ CUWp1CX1Ly OI the motlels being
used. Where the literature in early years shows examples of estimating
linear labor supply functions using OLS, the more recently published papers
present models which take into account the limited dependent nature of the
endogenous variable, the non-linearity or even the non-convexity of the
budget set, institutional constraints which restrict the choice set of the
individual, and random preference variation across individuals (see, for ex-
ample, the papers by Moffitt (1984) and Hausman (1985).
In addition, there is a tendency to extend models of individual labor
supply to models of household labor supply; examples are the articles by
Hausman and Ruud (1984), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986,1987) and Ransom (1987).
A first motivation for developing household models rather than individual
models is that there is some evidence that the exogeneity assumption on the
variable 'other household income' in individual labor supply models is not
always tenable (see Smith and Blundell (1986)). More importantly, male and
female labor supply decisions within a household are likely to be closely
structurally interrelated and a full understanding of labor supply behavior
requires to take this relationship into account in setting up the empirical
model.
The usual approach to describe the joint determination of male and female
labor supply is to specify a household utility function (or a dual repre-
sentation) with male leisure, female leisure and total household consumption
as arguments, and then to derive the corresponding male and female labor
supply equations by maximizing the household utility function subject to the
household budget constraintl). Although these household models seem to be an
improvement over individual models, they introduce the addítional problem of
a proper representation of the household's preferences and of the desicion
making process within the household. For example, if the male and the female
partner have different preferences, only under stringent conditions the
preferences of the household can be represented by a'representative'
household utility function (cf. Samuelson (1956) and Brown and Chuang
(1981)).4
Although game theory provides an appropriate theoretical framework for
developing more general models of the household's decision process (see,
e.g., Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1980)), the empirical
ir,~~,ieme,itatio~i oï these game theoretic household models has (yet) not been
very succesful. The usual approach in formulating a game theoretic model
is to specify individual utility functions and a certain concept of
equilibrium. One of the problems in the empirical implementation is that in
principle the number of utility parameters to be estimated will be twice as
large as compared to models based on household utility functions. The avail-
able data do usually not contain sufficient information to identify these
paramaters2). A further problem is that, except for some extremely restric-
tive functional forms for individual preferences and some specific choices
of the equilibrium concept, one can generally not derive closed form expres-
sions for the behavioral equations.
The present paper presents and estimates a game theoretic model of
household labor supply in a discrete setting (i.e. only the labor force par-
ticipation is considered). Provided that there is sufficient variation in
observed participation across subsamples, identification of the preference
ordering of both partners is possible. The model shows some similarities
with the models proposed by Bjorn and Vuong (1984,1985). These authors for-
mulate a game theoretic model of household labor force participation using
Nash (Bjorn and Vuong (1984)) and Stackelberg (Bjorn and Vuong (1985)) as
concepts of equilibrium. Although these papers present an interesting
generalization of traditional discrete choice models, the equilibrium con-
cepts adopted suffer from the fact that they may yield allocations which are
not Pareto optimal. As has been argued by Manser and Brown (1980) and others
it seems more appropriate, however, to employ a cooperative framework within
a household context, and hence to employ an equilibrium concept which yields
Pareto optimal outcomes only. The model in this paper will be developed
along such lines.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and equilibrium concept. The subject of Section 3 is the empirical im-
plementation and estimation of the model. We also discuss its relation to
simultaneous models for discrete endogenous variables with structural shift,
as discussed by Heckman (19~6) and Schmidt (1981). In contrast to the latter
type of models, the present model does not require any logical consistency5
condition on the parameters in order to be statistically meaningful. Section
4 presents empirical results; Section 5 concludes.
2. Household decision making as a cooperative game
Consider a household with a male and a female partner who jointly decide
on their labor force participation. Both partners (denoted by i-m and i-f,
respectively) can take one of two actions: participate (yi-1), or not par-
ticipate (yi-0). The utility partner i derives from each of the four
possible combinations of actions is denoted by UlÍYm'yf)' (In the sequel a
combination of actions will be called allocation ). The preferences of
partner i in this model are completely characterized by the order of his or
her four utility levels. For each partner 4! different orders of the utility
levels are possible. So, for a household there are (4!)2-5~6 possible com-
binations of utility orders.
Given the preferences of both partners we can define an equilibrium
concept. The aim of this is to attach an allocation to each combination of
utility orders. (In what follows a combination of utility orders will some-
times be called a game , a partner will sometimes be called a player , and
the allocation attached to a game will sometimes be called the outcome of
the game). As has been mentioned in Section 1, a cooperative framework seems
to be more appropriate in this case. Therefore, we accept the outcome of a
game only if it satisfies the requirement of being Pareto optimal.
It is well known that in the type of games described above there may be
one or two Nash equilibria or no Nash equilbrium, and that the Nash equi-
libria may be or may not be Pareto optimal. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium
(NE, hereafter) as such is not suitable in the present case. Our choice of
equilibrium concept is guided by our wish that the outcome of a game has to
be Pareto optimal, and preferably also Nash. This leads to the following be-
havioral assumptions:
Case 1(One Nash equilibrium). If the game has exactly one NE and if this NE
is Pareto optimal, we assume this to be the outcome of the game (see example
1).6
um(o.o) c[~(l.o) c um(1.1) c um(o.l)
Uf(0,0) C Uf(0,1) ( Uf(1,0) C Uf(1,1)
ExampZo. 1. Tho iinirnio NnoL. ., .al;s..-i~i In i -~~.. ...~w..,.,..,. , i~,1~ t~ Pareto optima"c.
If the unique NE is not Pareto optimal, there exists exactly one allocation,
at which both players are better off as compared to the Nash equilibrium3).
The household is then assumed to choose this Pareto efficient allocation
(see example 2).
um(l,o) c um(o,o) c um(1,1) c um(o.l)
Uf(0,1) ~ Uf(0,0) c Uf(1,1) C Uf(1,0)
Example 2. Allocation (1,1) is Pareto more effictent than the NE (0,0).
Case 2(Two Nash equilibria). If the game has two Nash equilibria at least
one of these will be Pareto optimal4). If only one NE is Pareto optimal, we
assume this to be the outcome of the game (example 3).
um(o.o) c um(l.o) c um(1,1) c um(o,l)
Uf(O,o) C Uf(1,1) c Uf(1,0) C Uf(0,1)
Example 3. T~o Nash equilíbria ((1,0) and (0,1)), only (0,1) ts Pareto
optimal.
If both NE are Pareto optimal, the household is assumed to choose one of
these with equal probabilities ( example 4).
um(o,o) c um(l,o) c um(1,1) c um(o,l)
Uf(0,0) c Uf(0,1) c Uf(1,1) c Uf(1,0)
Esample 4. Tmo Nash equtlibria ((1,0) and (0,1)), both Pareto optimal.
Case (No Nash equilibrium). If the game does not have a NE, there may two,
three or four Pareto optimal allocations (examples 5, 6 and ~.respectively). In such a case the household is assumed to choose one of the
Pareto optimal allocations with equal probabilities.
Um(0,0) C Um(1.0) C llm(1;11 C~rm(n~l)
Uf(0,1) C Uf(0,0) C Uf(1,0) ~ Uf(1,1)
Example 5. No Nash equtZibrium; t7uo Pareto optímal allocatíons ((1,1)
and (0,1)).
um(o.o) C um(1.1) ~ um(l.o) ~ um(o.l)
Uf(0,1) C Uf(0,o) C Uf(1,0) C Uf(1,1)
Example 6. No Nash equíZibríum; three Pareto opttmal aLlocations ((1,1),
(0,1) and (1,0)).
Um(0.0) C Um(1.1) C Um(0.1) C Um(1.0)
Uf(1,0) C Uf(0,1) C Uf(1,1) C Uf(O,o)
Example 7. No Nash equiZíbzium; aZl allocatíons are Pareto optímal.
Table 1 reviews the frequency of occurrence of the different pos-









one Pareto optimal NE




No Nash equilibrium ~2
two Par. opt. allocations 32
three Par. opt. allocations 32
four Par. opt. allocations 8
Total number of cases 5~68
As a final remark, we note that to determine the Nash equilibrium only
the following utility levels have to be compared:
for the male
um(l,o) i um(o,o) and um(1,1) i um(o,l)
and for the female
Uf(0,1) ) Uf(0,0) and Uf(1,1) ) Uf(1,0)
For each player there are four possible combinations. So, if one would
employ the Nash equilibrium (without the requirement that outcomes should be
Pareto optimal) only 16 different cases (rather than 576) for the household
would have to be considered.
3. Empirical implementation and estimation
Following McFadden's random utiliy hypothesis ( see, e.g., McFadden
(1981)), we assume that the utility level U1(Ym'yf) that individual i at-
taches to allocation (ym,yf) can be decomposed into a deterministic
component which depends upon a vector x of observed exogenous variables, and
a random component e which follows some probability distribution:
Ul(k~~) - X ~~k,~ ` Ek~C í-m,f; k,,~-0,1 (3.1)
Given the distributional assumptions on the e's, we can calculate the prob-
ability that a certain game will be played, i.e. we can evaluate
probabilities of the form
P[{Um(A)(Um(B)CUm(C)~Um(D)}and{(Uf(P)~Uf(Q)~Uf(R)CUf(S)}] (3.2)
where (A,B,C,D) and (P,Q,R,S) are elements from the set of all possible per-
mutations of the elements of .~ -{(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)}.
A popular distributional assumption in the discrete choice literature for
the random components in (3.1) is the Extreme Value distribution. We assume9
that
E~0' E01' E10' E11' E00' E01' E10 and E11 are independently Extreme
Value distributed, i.e.
P~EAC7) - PY~Í-PY~~-~)] (~ l)
where A E,~ and i-m,f5). J









where, to simplify notation, the superscript i has been omitted6j.
Using (3.4) we can calculate the probability that each of the 5~6 games
will be played. The probability that allocation (ym,yf) will be observed is
now simply the sum of the probabilities of all games with outcome (Ym'yf)'
To be more precise, let Pij be the probability that for household i the
j-th game is played (j-1,576). Let Sk~ be the set of all games with outcome
(k,.L) (k,,i-0,1) and let Ik~ be the set of households for which allocation
(k,~) is observed. Then the likelihood function of the model is given by:
L(P) - iÉI (jÉS Pij) ' iÉI (j~S Pij) " 00 00 O1 O1
iÉI10(j~S10Pij) ' iÉíll(j~S11Pij) (3.5)
where p denotes all the parameters appearing in the model.
At the present stage it seems useful to compare our model with the simul-
taneous model for dummy endogenous variables, as discussed by Heckman (1976)
and Schmidt (1981):10
~
ym - x'pm t~myf t em
.
yf - x~~f } ~fym } Ef
.
yi - 1 if yi ~ 0
yi -
r






A major difficulty with model (3.6) is that is requires ym.yf-0 in order to
be statistically meaningful~). With some rare exceptions (Waldman(1981) and
Ransom (198~)), such a parameter restriction cannot be motivated from
economic theory. In fact, it essentially removes simultaneity from the
model.
w
In the present context ym can be interpreted as the difference between
the utility the male attaches to participation and the utility he attaches
to non-participation, given y, i.e. given the action of the female: f
r
Ym - Um(1.Yf)-Um(O~Yf)
In view of (3.~), equation (3.6a) can be written as:
Um(1.1) - Um(0.1) - x'S t Y t E m m m




According to the game theoretic model, the expressions for the dif-
ferences in utility are (using equation (3.1)):
Um(1,1) - um(o.l) - x'(gil-~ól) ;(Eil-eio) - x'Hi t Ei (3.98)
Um(1.o) - Um(o.o) - x'(pi~-I~óo) t(Eio-eoo) - x'A~ t eó (3.9b)
Comparing (3.8) and (3.9) it appears that the game theoretic model has some
important advantages over the simultaneous model with structural shíft.
Firstly, the coefficients in (3.8a) are equal to the coefficients in (3.8b),
except for the constant term, whereas in the coefficients in (3.9a) may be
different from those in (3.9b). Secondly, the error term in (3.8a) is iden-
tical to the error term in (3.8b), whereas in (3.9a) and (3.9b) the errors11
terms are allowed to be different. The third and perhaps most important ad-
vantage of the game theoretic model is that is does not require any logical
consistency restriction on the parameters. The root of the logical consis-
tcncy probl~W of t~~e siwui~ru~enous moàel with structural shift are equations
(3.6c) and ( 3.6d), which describe the relation between the latent variables
and the observed discrete variables. In the game theoretic model this rela-
tion is described by a game, which essentially replaces equations ( 3.6c) and
(3-6a).
4. Estimation results
The model has been estimated using data from a labor mobility survey in
The Netherlands, conducted in 1985. The sample contains 849 households.
Since in The Netherlands (and in our sample) almost all males have a
paid job, it seems more interesting to model the choice between working full
time and working part time for males rather than their choice between work-
ing or not working at sll. In our empirical analysis we therefore define
ym and yf as follows:
y- 1 if the male works at least 38 hours per week m
- 0 if the male works less than 38 hours per week
yf - 1 if the female works a positive number of hours per week
- 0 if the female does not work
The 38 hours cut-off point is motivated by the fact that in The Netherlands
a full time job usually stands for a working-week of 38 hours. In the total
sample of 849 households allocation (0,0) is observed in 141 cases, (0,1) in
82 cases, (1,0) in 37~ cases and (1,1) in 249 cases.
The set of explanatory variables is specified in the equations below:
UmÍk,R) - ~k~ ; ~k~.K6 t ~k~.FS t ~~.AGEM t
f ~k~.EDUCM t ~k~.NLINC t e~ (4.1a)
UfÍk,~) - ~k~ ' gk~.K6 t ~k~.FS ~ ~k~.AGEF t12
t pk~.EDUCF . g~.NLINC 4 ek~ (4.1b)
where
K6: 1 if the household contains at least one child younger than 6,
0 otherwise
FS: Niimber of persons in the household
AGEM: Age of the male partner
AGEF: Age of the female partner
EDUCM: Education index of the male partner
EDUCF: Education index of the female partner
NLINC: Non-labor income of the household per week (x .01; in Dfl.).
The education index ranges from 1 to 5, 1 representing the lowest and 5 the
highest level of education.
Although wage rates do not appear in the model directly, the wage effect
is captured by including age and education, which have turned out to be im-
portant predictors for (potential) wage rates in several studies (see for
example Meyer and Wise (1983)).
For reasons of comparability with the simultaneous model with structural
shift, we impose restrictions on the p's such that, according to (3.8a)
and (3.8b),
(~11 - ~ol) - (~lo - ~oo) } ~i
i-m,f (4.2)
Since a normalization of the utility levels is required, we finally impose
~00-~00-0.
After eliminating pil from the likelihood function ( 3.5) using
(4.2), the likelihood is maximized with respect to ~O1' ~10' y'~O1' S10'
and yf.
Table 2 presents the estimation results8).13

































First of all we note that both ym and ~f are significantly different from
zero, i.e. our results reject the restrictions on preferences that would be
imposed by the logical consistency condition for the simultaneous model with14
structural shift. Notice that ~m and ~rf have opposite signs. The negative
value for ~m indicates that labor force participation of the wife makes the
husband more inclined to work part time rather than full time. For females
wH nhcprva .iiPP.. ..c~,..~ ----.- ~- ~---~-~,-~ ~..~~~. n iuïi time job oi the husband makes the
wifemore inclined to work than a part time job of the husband.
In discussing the estimation results for the p's, we choose to focus
primarily on Ul(1,0)-U1(0,1), i.e. the difference between the utility
partner i attaches to 'male works full time, female does not work' and the
utility he~she attaches to 'male works part time, female works'. For the
male the presence of young children, his age and his level of education have
a significant positive effect on this difference. So, for example, the older
the male, the more he prefers to be the only breadwinner in the household.
For females, the size of the family has a significant positive effect on the
utility difference, whereas the effect of her education level is sig-
nificantly negative. So, the smaller the family and the higher her level of
education, the more the wife prefers to share working outdoors with her
husband. The effect of having young children turns out to be more subtle.
The presence of a young child decreases the utility the female attaches to
the allocation 'male works part time, female works', but also the utility
she attaches to 'male works full time, female does not work'.
To see how the effects ultimately affect the participation probabilities,
we have calculated these probabilities for different types of households;
see table 3(remember that for males 0 means working full time and 1 working
part time).15
Table 3. Estimated participation probabilities for different householdsa)






































a) NLINC has been set to its sample mean.
One of the things table 3 shows is that the presence of young children in
the household does not only decrease the participation probability for the16
female, but also makes the husband more likely to have a part time rather
than a full time job, especially in younger families. Households with a full
time working male and a working female are most frequently observed among
~~,.. ~. : -....-
.,aav- aat~aaCl Cdill.atCU ci11LL SWi111CL' L aI11111e5.
The generality of the model allows to test for equality of the systematic
part of male and female preferences9). On the basis of a likelihood ratio
test the joint hypothesis
~O1-~01' ~10-~10 ~d ~-~f is rejected
decisivelyl0). This result indicates that employing a more general decision
making framework may not only be theoretically more appealling, but also em-
pirically important in describing household labor supply decisions.
5. Conclusions
We have presented and estimated a simultaneous model for discrete choice,
rooted within a utility maximization framework where different members of
the decision making unit are allowed Lo have different preferences.
A distinctive property of the model is that observed allocations are as-
sumed to be Pareto optimal outcomes of a game being played in the household,
which seems to be more realistic in a household context than the use of non-
cooperative equilibria (such as Nash or Stackelberg). In contrast to
simultaneous models for discrete choice with structural shift, the model in
this paper does not require any logical consistency restriction on the
parameters to be statistically meaningful.
Although the empirical specification has been relatively simple, the
results suggest that the model combines some desirable theoretical
properties with the capability of appropriately describing observed data on
household labor force participation.Footnotes
1) It may be useful to note that such model can be interpreted as the
~.ii, ~.7 {~.. ..F ~[~ -~ ~
~....v....... .v~... va u iy3tcw Vi ,.WV J1WUll,ailCVUb CljUtlLlU115, ~,11C 11L~SG C. -'qUaLlOn
being the conditional male labor supply equation given fixed female labor
supply and the second equation being the conditional female labor supply
equation given fixed male labor supply.
2) Kooreman and Kapteyn ( 1985) use survey information on actual working
hours and on desired working hours of respondents to arrive at identifica-
tion in a game theoretic household labor supply model. Their procedure,
however, requires strong assumptions on the interpretation of the responses
to the survey questions.
3) Let (k,R) be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) which is not Pareto optimal
(k,~C-0,1). Because it is a NE we have Um(k,R))Um(1-k,R) and Uf(k,R)~Uf(k,l-
R). So, the allocation at which both players are better off than at (k,R) is
(1-k,l-R).
4) Suppose (k,R) is one of the two NE (k,R-0,1). Then we have
Um(k.R) ) Um(1-k,R) (F1)
and
UfÍk.R) ~ Uf(k.l-R) (F2)






Allocatíons (1-k,R) and (k,l-R) cannot be Pareto more efficient than (k,,C)
in view of (F1) and (F2), whereas (1-k,R) and (k,l-R) cannot be Pareto more
efficient than (1-k,l-R) in view of (F3) and (F4). If18
U1(k,~) ~ U1(1-k,1-~) i-m,f (F5)
then only (k,~) is Pareto optimal ((1-k,1-~) if the inequality is reversed).
r~
U1(k,~) ) U1(1-k,1-~) and U~(k,~) C U~(1-k,1-~) i~j
then both ( k,~) and (1-k,1-~) are Pareto optimal.
5) Another possibility is to assume that the e's follow a multivariate nor-
mal distribution. In that case the evaluation of probabilities of the form
(3.1) requires higher order numerical integration. The computational burden
of estimation would then become so large, that a supercomputer would be
needed. This will be left for future research.
6) The fact that EÁ has a non zero mean (EEÁ-.577216) is innocent as it
only affects the constant term in ~1.
A
~) This can be seen as follows. The model implies the following conditions
on (Em,ef) for the different regimes:
ym-1 implies x'~m t~m . em ) 0 or E m )-x'~m -~m
yf-1 l x~~f } ~f } ~f ~ 0 ~ef ~ -x'~f - ~f
ym-1 implies x'Sm t Em ) 0 or Em ~-x'Sm
yf-0 { x'~f t yf t ef C 0 ~ef C-x'~f -~f
~ym-0 implies ~ x'~m ; ~m t em C 0 or ~Em C-x'~m
- ym
f-1 x' f t Ef ) 0 ef ~-x'~f
ym-o implies x'~m t em C 0 or em C-x'~m
Yf-O ~ x'Sf . ef C 0 ~ef C-x'~f
In figure 1, the conditions for the different regimes have been represented
in the (em,ef)-plane for ~m)0 and ~f~0. Clearly, the conditions define sets
in the (sm,Ef)-plane which are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. As19









Figure 1. Regions in the (Em,Ef - lane
8) The model is not identified if there are no explanatory variables (other
than the constant term). In that case there are six parameters to be es-
timated, while there are only three independent probabilities to be
explained. A formal proof of identification in the case with explanatory
variables can be given along the lines set forth in Rothenberg (1971) but
will not be presented here.




model reduces to a multinomial logit model.20
10) The test statistic follows a X2(13) distribution and is computed at
69.2. The critical levels for 5x and lx are 22.4 and 2~.~, respectively.21
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